My work examines the extent to which countries in Latin America exercise their role as active political-economic agents in the international system. By focusing on cross-Pacific interactions, my work examines the China-Latin America relationship to determine its economic, political, and social impact on the region’s development and global integration processes. I also examine how these cross-Pacific interactions can influence Latin American countries’ dynamics with traditional partners such as the United States and European countries, as well as China’s evolving position in different global systems. In general, I’m interested in analyzing the relationship between economic growth, political legitimacy, and power in the context of a changing international environment in the 20th and 21st centuries.
One assumption about the developing countries is that they can be at the behest of their more developed counterparts. I argue this is not always the case. By identifying the economic rise of China as an important change in the global economy, I show that smaller countries can be active economic agents in the global economy—they are not just passive actors and they can shape the outcomes of their interactions with more powerful actors.
This chapter builds on the growing consensus among scholars that national and subnational dynamics in host countries matter to BRI projects and the different inflows of Chinese capital in general. By examining China’s investments in Peru’s extractives sector and a growing number of Chinese infrastructure projects, we illustrate host country agency when interacting with the Chinese state and its firms. Despite China’s overwhelming economic weight over countries in the Global South, host country actors have always mattered and play a role in shaping the progression or cancelation of deals with China. For instance, China’s failed participation in the construction of the Interoceanic Highway and the currently stagnant Amazon waterway project demonstrate that local actors and politics, as well as local concerns, can dissuade policymakers from including China as a participant or from moving forward after a deal has been signed. On the surface, China is seen as a powerful and influential actor, yet Chinese leaders and Chinese firms still have to negotiate and seek agreement from national and subnational leaders, agencies, and even communities in host countries. To strengthen these findings, we illustrate host country agency in other regions, examining Chinese projects in the Philippines, Zambia, and Pakistan.
Despite the emergence of a rich literature on the rise of China in Latin America (LAC) since 2000, we are still grappling with this phenomenon. In this article we seek to theorize this expanding South–South relationship from two vantage points. First, from the perspective of China, we argue that, by necessity, the PRC has had to internationalize its development strategy in order to compensate for its serious natural resource deficit, feed the world's largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world. LAC has been just one slice of China's ‘go out’ strategy. Our second perspective probes the effect of China's entry into the region. Through the lens of development economics, we identify three separate political economy scenarios that have been accentuated within those countries that have the strongest economic ties with China. We rely on measures of institutional performance and macro-economic trends to illustrate the variable effects of China on LAC.
Peru's trade and investment relationship with China is overwhelmingly concentrated in the mining sector. The country is well- positioned to oversee a positive mining-based relationship with China, having recently taken several important steps to increase transparency and accountability in this sector. Overall, there is no one Chinese way of doing business in Peru. Chinese mining firms do not appear to be either the best or worst in the country, but their experiences have been emblematic of the challenges that all foreign investors face.
There is a growing consensus among scholars that national and subnational dynamics in host countries matter to Belt and Road projects and inflows of Chinese capital more generally speaking. Before Chinese projects can be constructed or implemented in a determined country, its political and economic leaders need to first agree with the selection, typology, and cost of the projects presented to them. There is a negotiation process between its bureaucracy and the Chinese firms and financiers, among the political elites, as well as its civil society actors. In other words, this is a multi-level game that is played across and within borders.
What does the consolidation of Xi’s power and influence mean for Latin America? For the past decade, China’s ties with Latin American countries have remained concentrated among a few players: Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. China’s “new era” means that the country has become more comfortable with its position as a global leader, and, as such, it will continue to pursue opportunities that will solidify this role. Although no drastic changes toward Latin America are anticipated, China’s greater confidence brings forth the question of the extent to which China’s soft power in the region will remain largely restricted to trade, and if it is expanded, how leaders in Beijing will leverage its access and economic importance for diplomatic goals.
This paper examines the impact of Chinese investments in Latin America’s efforts to diversify investment partners and/or basket of products. Two main questions are: (1) are China’s increased investments pushing other (investing) countries out? (2) are they filling a void left by other countries? As China increases its economic footprint in Latin America, one perception is that China has been growing at the expense of other countries and displacing powerful partners like the United States. Yet some LAC countries have shown that these Chinese investments have been driven by the host country’s demands and interests. Thus, this project analyzes whether China is the “new boss in town.”
In 2021, China tested a hypersonic missile that caused the arms control and international security community to raise the alarm about China’s nuclear capabilities. Thus, a familiar question has reemerged: Who will be the first to arm space? While existing international legal instruments prevent any state from arming space, observers fear that a Cold War-style competition between the US and China could lead to a dramatic shift of the current status quo and the weakening of these tools, especially as Russia's power recedes due to its invading Ukraine. Are the current instruments robust enough to prevent further militarization of space? This paper seeks to find answers to these questions.